17th Philosophers' Carnival

        Hello and welcome to Tiberius and Gaius Speaking...(a reference to the reform minded Gracchi brothers in Republican Rome who were assassinated)I am proud to be hosting the 17th Philosophers' Carnival, and we have a lot of great stuff.
    Unlike other Carnivals, I don't plan to really have a theme, but I hope to make up for it by providing some constructive criticism. It should, of course be noted, that this is a sign of respect for all the posters who I think did a wonderful job. All links connect you directly to the posts I am discussing. I apologize for all typos and malapropisms in advance.

Post One: The Ravens' Paradox

•  Introduction: Richard Chappell over at Philosophy Etc gives us his take on the Ravens' Paradox. This paradox arises because "All ravens are black" is logically equivalent "All non-black things are non ravens." But it is very odd to say that evidence that confirms the latter sentence also is evidence for the former. While finding a "red herring" would serve as a kind of confirming evidence for the second statement, it would be quite strange to say that finding a red herring confirms the fact that all ravens are black.
• Commentary: Richard, very cleverly, argues that this strangeness is misleading (by taking on Hempel). If you were to take a random sampling of objects in the world and discovered no non black ravens (that is, all the non black objects were non ravens), then that would be evidence that all ravens are black. If there were non-black ravens, you would expect them to show up in a suitably random collection of objects at least some of the time. So, seeing a red herring really is very weak evidence for all ravens being black under certain circumstances. I think there really is something to this, but I do have one worry. And that is the weight of evidence seems to be different for logically equivalent statements. While Richard has shown that seeing a red herring can be very weak evidence for all ravens being black, it seems that it is better evidence for all non black things being non ravens. Thus, the problem remains since the asymmetry remains.

Post 2: Literature and Philosophy

•  Introduction: Can literature serve philosophical ends? Clark at Mormon Metaphysics argues that it can by relying on Heidegger's argument that truth is a matter of unveiling. Literature can serve to unveil truth as well as anything else.

• Commentary: It seems to me that Clark is clearly right here. If dialogues, thought experiments, or analogies (or pictures, as Clark argues) can serve philosophical interests, then it seems pretty clear that literature can do so as well. On the other hand, I think we are right to be skeptical of novels and other literary worlds that purport to prove a philosophical point because those worlds are not really bound by what is so. This is a reason for caution but not outright rejection.

Post Three: Hiroshima, Catholic Bishops, and Mencius

• Introduction: In a post that is especially interesting to me because I don't know much (read: anything at all) about Chinese philosophy, The Useless Tree argues that Confucius and Mencius would condemn the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Using textual support, the post demonstrates that Confucius believed in a)just causes and b) humane treatment of non-combatants in war. Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, ex hypothesi, arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustified, then Confucius and Mencius would condemn the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
• Commentary: I am not really qualified to comment on the exegesis, but it is a bit strained to move from Confucius's emphasis on treating defeated populations humanely to a prescription to act humanely during combat. Certainly in the history of Western warfare we can find rulers (Alexander to name but one) who did the former but not the latter and were considered enlightened because of it. Still, I found it fascinating.

Post 4: Unger's Epistemology

• Introduction: Rex Hubbard takes aim at our knowledge of "2+2=4." According to Ungerian epistemology, to know something must include being absolutely certain about it (so says Rex, I am taking his word for it). Rex shows that even though we are absolutely certain of our existence, we are not absolutely certain of the truth arithmetic statements. Consequently, we do not know that "2+2=4."
• Commentary: Rex is right, I think, to say that we cannot know for absolute certainty that either physicalism  and Mathematical Theory X (which requires the real existence of numbers for arithmetic statements to be true) are true and, therefore, we cannot know that "2+2=4" under Ungerian epistemology. "So much the worse for Ungerian epistemology" is my attitude, but I am but a novice in epistemology.

Post 5: Killing and Letting Die

• Introduction: Aristotle over at the Lyceum (you'd think that Aristotle could get published in reputable journals) argues that James Rachels' thought experiment attacking the distinction between killing and letting die is deeply problematic. The thought experiment is basically this: two men want to drown their baby nephew for the inheritance, and one actually does so while the other notices that the baby is drowning on its own and simply watches as it dies. The basic point here is that these actions are morally equivalent and there is no distinction between killing someone and simply letting them die.
• Commentary: Aristotle has five objections, and they are well taken. Unfortunately, I think they largely prove too much. Most of his objections could be laid against any intuitions and thought experiments  that purported to prove that the distinction in question was valid. Aristotle seems skeptical ( as am I) about intuition-oriented ethics more generally. But I don't think his objections specifically address Rachels' thought experiment and nothing else.

Post Six: Question of the Day? Beam me up Scotty!

• Introduction: Jason at Positive Liberty asks you to consider the following Parfitian scenario: “We propose to kill you, quickly and painlessly. In return, we will construct an exact duplicate of yourself, perfect down to the molecules. Your duplicate will have all your physical attributes, abilities, and character traits. He will even remember having had all your experiences. In short, no one will be able to distinguish the duplicate from the previous you by any test whatsoever. We will also pay that duplicate ten million dollars.” Jason then goes on to discuss various aspects of this scenario.
• Commentary: This post does a very good job laying out some of the thethoughts that run through our heads when we consider these scenarios. The only thing I would point out is that our difficulty with these scenarios is really a difficulty over identity and not religion. What makes us us? When a transporter takes us apart and puts us back together again, do we die? Most of our unease with these situations is founded in our confusion and ambivalence about our personal identity.

Posts Seven and Eight: Willing and Normativity Parts One and Two

• Introduction: This series of posts I wrote for Philosophy Etc. It lays out a Korsgaardian/Kantian neo-constructivist account of normativity. In particular, I would like people to take a look at Part Two, but Part One provides some important context.

• Commentary: No commentary as I wrote the posts.

Post Nine: Silly Things Said about Philosophy

•  Introduction: Brian Weatherson at Thoughts, Arguments, and Rants asks people, "What are some of the silliest things people have said about philosophy?"
• Commentary: I think people are generally cautious about philosophy, but if you want some silliness you should ask people about "metaphysics." Golly.

Post Ten: The Vagaries of Moral Attention

• Introduction: The world would be a much better place is we paid attention to the right things. Michael Cholbi has a post at PEA Soup where he tries to explain why media (and by extension, their viewers) focus on things like a girl disappearing in Aruba (or the Russians in the submarine) but not on things like the famine in Niger. Michael presents some tentative analysis as to why this might be the case that is very clear and thought-provoking.
• Commentary: Michael captures most of the important explanations for why we care more about one story and not about another (despite the greater human tragedy of the latter), but he misses one: media bias. Michael too quickly dismisses the possibility that the reason people pay attention to Aruba or the Russians is that these are the issues that are covered by the media. I think the media are much more capable of altering what people pay attention to than Michael gives them credit for. But covering famine in Niger is hard, expensive, and complicated. Covering Aruba is sexy, easy, and inexpensive. It is not surprising that news editors in this day of shrinking staff and budgets choose to cover one and not the other. Terrible, but not suprising.
  

Post 11: So you Want to Live in a Free Society, Part 5

• Introduction: Elizabeth Anderson over at Left2Right has a truly excellent post up about property rights and their appropriate place in a schema of liberty.  By examining cases where our liberty is curtailed when we have to constantly ask other people for permission to move or act, she produces an argument in favor of three things: "1. An argument in favor of keeping certain parcels of land in the commons; 2. An argument in favor of the common carrier rule (the common law rule that operators of transportation, communication, and hotel services offer their services to all, without discrimination);
  3. An argument in favor of applying the common carrier rule to pharmacists and other providers of medical care."
• Commentary: I don't really have anything to add. It is a very good post, and everyone, especially libertarians, should read it.

Posts 12 and 13: "Nietszche on Sin and Doubt" and "Beveridge on Language"

• Introduction: These are two columns that have appeared on the About Atheism website. They really aren't blog entries, but they are well-written and make some interesting points.  Go take a look.

Post 14: Ontological Commitment

• Introduction: Over at Antimeta, we have a post arguing that it makes sense to say that existential quantifiers do not necessarily indicate an ontological commitment. Basically, we simply have to accept that, in certain cases, we have an existential quantifier that does not bring with it any ontological commitment.
• Commentary: My training does not adequately prepare to comment on this, but I must admit that I find the idea that the existential quantifier brings with it no ontological commitment to be strange. But as in Lewis' Proof that P, the fact that I find something obvious is no reason to believe that it is true.

Post 15: Moral Psychology II: The Life and Death of Moral Rationalism

• Introduction: Chris over MixingMemory has a very thorough post about the development of moral psychology and the dialogue between Kantians (rationalists) and Humeans (empiricists) that is ongoing. He goes through several thinkers (Piaget, Koholberg, Turiel, Gilligan, Blair, and Nichols) and explains how "affect" has to come to play in increasingly central role in moral psychology. It is really very interesting and it is helpful for us ethicists to at least have some knowledge of the science going on concerning moral psychology.
• Commentary: While I think Chris' exegesis is spot on for the most part, the one quibble I would have is with his description of Korsgaard and Nagel as pure rationalists. I don't think that Korsgaard would deny that "affect" can influence our decisions and plays a part in our moral psychology. Further, one thing I wonder about is how much this Humean story of moral psychology is dependent on a Humean associationistic philosophy of mind.

There you go folks. That is the 17th Philosophers' carnival. I had fun putting it together, and I hope you had fun reading it. If you are interested in hosting, be sure to check out the homepage of the Philosophers' Carnival or contact Richard Chappell over at Philosophy Etc.

UPDATE: Thanks to John in the comments for pointing out the lack of a link on the last post. It has been fixed.

Comments

[John T.]

There's no link to the last one.

[Sam Douglas]

Nice work.

[Sam]

Thanks for the comments. You are right. It is a bit strained. Should I blame it on the crushing pressure of blogging? No. I will just have to do a better job next time demonstrating Confucian pacificism.

Best,

Sam "Useless Tree" Crane

[Patrick]

Don't beat yourself up Sam.

At least you are taking Confucian statements about political philosophy and extrapolating more political philosophy.

This is opposed to Christians who are forced to try and create political philosophy whole hog out of statements by Jesus of Nazareth that are not explicitly political.